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There seems a general consensus among industrial relations scholars
that the "velocity" with which workers move from one job to the next is
picking up in our economy.' Gone are the halcyon days in which workers
enjoyed long-term, perhaps even lifetime, employment with one firm,
working stepwise up the firm's vertically integrated job ladder. These
employees were governed by the firm's "internal labor market"- a series of
rules for promotion and compensation negotiated and administered by
human relations experts and the workers' representatives. Instead, today,
workers are likely to experience much shorter job tenure over their work
lives, either by contract or subcontract, passing from employer to employer.
Employers are now enabled, even required, by the new information
technology and globalization of the economy, to organize in lean "niche"
firms which specialize in one aspect of production or supply and to
"outsource" all other aspects to other horizontally specialized firms?
The general consensus is that this acceleration of the labor market has
been bad for workers, and has presented new problems for employers as
well. Increased job turnover has placed increased risk and responsibility
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1. See RICHARD S. BELOus, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE
TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE 15-17 (1989) (addressing high
turnover rates among today's employees); PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK:
MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORKFORCE 1 (1999) (noting that one result of market
changes is the decrease of employee loyalty to particular employers); STEPHEN A.
HERZENBERG, ET AL., NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY: EMPLOYMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN

POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 108-10 (1998) (discussing how current trends have led to higher

employee turnover, and the impact of this change).
2. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology:
Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 5-12 (2001) (citing the
advantages and disadvantages of internal labor markets compared to shorter-term spot
markets for labor).
3. Id.
4. CAPPELLI, supra note 1, at 153-4; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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on employees. In addition to increased risk of unemployment, workers
have become more responsible for their own training and benefits. Why
would an employer retrain employees whose skills have become obsolete
when the average tenure at the firm is only a few years? Given the higher
turnover rate of employees, even if the employer provides a pension, it will
have to be of the more mobile "defined contribution" variety that leaves the
risk of investment on the employee. Temporary or contingent employees
are also less likely to enjoy employer-provided medical benefits; these
employees are either left with the responsibility of providing their own
insurance or to suffer the considerable risk of medical bills.5
For
employers, increased turnover allows for increased flexibility and
decreased benefits expenses, but creates problems of evaluating new
employees and monitoring their work. Higher turnover also increases the
potential for "theft" of trade secrets or customers by departing employees,
thus imperiling employer investments in these business assets.6
Alan Hyde's new book, Working in Silicon Valley: Economic and
Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market,' provides an interesting
and important exception to this general consensus. Using the example of
high tech "information workers," Hyde argues that sometimes high velocity
labor markets can be good for employees and necessary to enable the full
realization of their employers' investments in information technology.
Hyde's basic thesis is "that the contracts and labor market intermediaries
characteristic of Silicon Valley's high-velocity labor market exist in order
to realize the endogenous economic growth that comes from the production
and diffusion of valuable information."8 He provides a detailed account of
these employment contracts and practices, based on his extensive
interviews of participants in this labor market, and then a unique economic
analysis of this market based on the translation of information economics
into labor economics.
The fundamental insight that drives Hyde's theoretical analysis is his
observation that "all the firm's technical property has life only in the minds
and bodies of its employees and is realized in labor markets."9
Accordingly, it is important "to treat the labor market as in part a market
for information."'0 Hyde cites several respectable models of information
economics that suggest that, due to "network effects," information can
5. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 4-5.
6. Eric A. Posner, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE FROM AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
PERSPECTIVE, (Chicago Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 137, 2001); Paul H. Rubin &

Peter Shedd, Human Capitaland Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 93 (1981).
7. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003).

8. Id. at 50.
9. Id. at 70.
10. Id. at 69.

20041

BOOK REVIEW

sometimes be more valuable when shared among competitors and that
economic growth depends primarily on this sharing of such information."
Accordingly, employees with valuable information might be actively
sought by other employers, or may enjoy their own start-up opportunities.
These employees can do themselves, their employers and the economy in
general, considerable good by passing from job to job to transmit this
information. The primary policy implication of this analysis is that the
state should not enforce covenants not to compete or broad trade secret
protections that hinder the transmission of employees and information
among firms.
Hyde's book is interesting and useful from both empirical and
theoretical perspectives. Hyde's tone sets forth a detailed picture of the
express and implied terms and conditions of employment that govern
employment relationships in Silicon Valley, as well as the technological
factors and larger legal context that give impetus to these terms.' 2 Topics
covered include the following: a brief history of Silicon Valley, express
and implicit contract terms, hiring flexible labor, H- lB visas, labor market
intermediaries, employee organization, stock options, pensions, health
insurance, and discrimination. Such a detailed depiction is made possible
only by the hours of painstaking interviews and ethnographic research
undertaken by Professor Hyde for this project. Hyde presents a useful
comparison of practices in Silicon Valley with employment practices in the
less economically prosperous Route 128 district of Massachusetts, where
covenants not to compete are enforced.' 3
Hyde is also undoubtedly correct in his fundamental insight that
employees embody the employer's technical property and can be an
important avenue for the dissemination of such information. The primary
question that remains in his analysis is the general applicability of his
analysis.
How many industries are impacted by the information
transmission aspect of the employment relationship to the extent that it
drives the basic terms of that relationship? Assuming that this phenomenon
is not universal, should the legislatures and courts, in the formulation of
public policy, distinguish between such cases with respect to the impact on
the employment relationship? If so, how?

11. Id. at 55-56 (citing, for example, Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of
QWERTY, 75 AM. EcON. REV. 332 (1985), and W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS
AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994)).
12. HYDE, supra note 7, at 4-23, 93-254.
13. Id. at 33.
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I.THE TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT
AND INVESTMENTS IN INFORMATION

The traditional economic analysis of the employment relationship
describes two paradigms regarding the duration of the employment
relationship: a "spot market" for labor which yields short-term employment
and an "internal labor market" which yields long-term employment.
A spot market for labor is envisioned as a place employers go each
day to purchase the type and amount of labor they need for that day's
projects. Under such an arrangement, the employment relationship is very
ephemeral, lasting perhaps as little as a few minutes. The workers' wages
might vary from day to day, depending on the supply and demand for a
given type of labor. Payment would be made only for current production
and in cash, with workers left to purchase their own benefits out of their
wages. This arrangement holds both advantages and disadvantages for
employers and employees. A spot market for labor provides employers
with the ultimate flexibility in planning production since they purchase
only the labor they currently need. However, it requires the employer to
evaluate and closely monitor employees each day, and places on employees
the risks and responsibilities of obtaining training and benefits. 5
Such rapid turnover in the labor market also aggravates a problem for
employers with respect to investments in general training and information.
Becker's theory of human capital distinguishes between particular training
that is useful to only one employer and general training that is useful to
many employers.' 6 Becker argues that employers will invest in particular
training, but not general training, because other employers will bid away
employees with valuable general training, preventing the employer from
realizing an adequate return on her investment. Accordingly, under
Becker's model, employees are left to make all investments in general
training. A problem arises when employees cannot adequately finance
such general training because the investment is more than the employee can
finance given imperfections in the capital market.'7 Trade secrets and
customer lists are some of the examples commonly given of such expensive
general information. 8 Employers will invest in such general information
only if they can establish sufficient control or an enforceable property
claim over this information so that they can recoup a sufficient return on
their investment. Absent this, the traditional economic model predicts that
too little of such information will be produced.
14. GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS 401 (1996).
15.
16.
17.
18.

Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 4-5.
GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 33-51 (3d ed. 1993).
Rubin & Shedd, supra note 6.
Id.
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The alternative paradigm to a spot market for labor in the traditional
economic analysis is the internal labor market. 9 Under this paradigm,
employers solve some of the problems of the spot market by employing
their workers for longer periods of time, perhaps for life, and regulating
their relationship with a "market" of administrative rules for promotion and
compensation that is internal to the firm. A longer employment
relationship saves search costs by reducing turnover, and allows wages to
vary from productivity over the course of the employment relationship. 0
The disengagement of wages from production allows employers to defer
employees' wages over his "life-cycle" for the purposes of efficient
monitoring, investment in training, and provision of health and pension
benefits." In particular, economists have argued that, by establishing a
longer employment relationship and using trade secret protection and
covenants not to compete, employers can establish adequate control and
ownership of general information to encourage their efficient investment in
the production of such knowledge. 22 Of course, long-term employment and
the internal labor market have their own problems of increased
administrative costs and lessened flexibility of employers to respond to
changes in markets. 23
At any given time in the economy, there are short-term employees
who operate in an environment akin to a spot market for labor and longterm employees governed by an internal labor market. Predictably, shortterm employees tend to be found in jobs where individual productivity is
easy to evaluate and in which there is little investment in training; for
example, landscape gardening or apparel manufacture.24 Long-term
employees tend to be found in jobs where individual productivity is hard to
evaluate and there is a high investment in training; for example, airplane
assembly workers and college professors.
As previously stated,
academics have observed that recently our economy seems to have been
moving away from the paradigm of long-term employment and internal
labor markets and toward a spot market for labor. As the new information
19. PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND

MANPOWER ANALYSIS 27 (2d ed. 1985).
20. With long-term employment, wages can vary from current production as long
as the discounted value of wages over the course of the employment relationship equals the
discounted value of the employee's production. Economists have found empirically that for
many employees wages are below productivity early in their work-life and then above
productivity late in their work life. ROBERT G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN
LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 193-201 (1982); GILBERT R. GHEZ &
GARY S. BECKER, THE ALLOCATION OF TIME AND GOODS OVER THE LIFE CYCLE ch. 3 (1975).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2.
Rubin & Shedd, supra note 6.
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 7-8.
Supra note 20, at.
Id.
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technology has allowed international outsourcing and coordination of
production, firms have come to specialize in only certain parts, or "niches,"
of supply and production. This new international business environment has
placed a premium on employer flexibility and undermined the vertical
structure of production within firms that facilitate long-term employment.26
As a result, employees' careers are now more likely to consist of a series of
movements from employer to employer, rather than a series of promotions
with the same employer.
Commentators have generally bemoaned the effects of this
acceleration of the employment relationship on employees and investments
in training. It is argued that the new "contingent" employment relationship
of temporary, part-time and subcontracted workers has decreased job
security, employee bargaining power, employees' ability to organize,
employer provided benefits and on-the-job training. 27 There is good
theoretical and empirical support for all of these assertions. Although there
is some debate over how new the contingent employment phenomenon is,
empirical estimates suggest that employee turnover is rising while average
job tenure is falling. 2' Transitory employees have always been harder to
organize because they have less of an attachment to a given workplace, and
therefore less incentive to undertake the investment necessary to organize
that workplace, and they are generally easier to replace.29 Independent of
its effect on the velocity of the employment relationship, the new
information technology has also undermined employees' bargaining power
in the United States by facilitating international production and trade with
countries that have much lower wages. Employer provision of health
insurance benefits and pensions has declined in recent years.30 More
importantly, for the purpose of this essay, employer-provided on-the-job
training has declined in recent years in the United States, despite increasing

26. CAPELLI, supra note 1, at 99-100; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 10-12.
27. See, e.g., BELOus, supra note 1 (recognizing the disadvantages of contingent
workers); CAPPELLI, supra note 1, at 153-54 (comparing employment changes in the United
States to the situation in Japan); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 2, at 10-12 (discussing how the
current economic environment discourages internal labor markets and lifetime
employment); HERZENBERG, ET AL., supra note 1, at 108-10 (discussing how shorter tenures
makes it difficult for employees to gain experiential learning and effective mentoring).
28. See BELOUS, supra note 1, at 15-17 (describing how the current market favors
short-term workers over long-term workers); Ame L. Kalleberg, Part-Time Work and
Workers in the United States: Correlatesand Policy Issues, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 771,
771 (1995) ("[B]etween 25 to 30% of all employees in the U.S. civilian labor force, or 29.9
to 36.6 million workers, in 1988 were either part-time workers, temporary workers, contract
employees, or independent consultants.").
29. LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF UNIONS
(Mario F. Bognanno & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1992).

30. Patricia Schroeder, Does the Growth in the Contingent Work Force Demand a
Change in FederalPolicy?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 731, 733-36 (1995).
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demands for ever-higher levels of employee skills.3'
II. THE CONTRARY EXAMPLE OF THE HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET OF
THE SILICON VALLEY

In his book, Working in Silicon Valley, Hyde documents that at least
some employees in the Silicon Valley do very well in a high-velocity labor
market. Highly skilled information workers in California enjoy high
wages, stock options, and a seemingly endless stream of lucrative job and
start-up opportunities. However, health insurance and pensions are not
provided by employers, and average job tenure of employees is only about
one or two years."

Moreover, based on the success of Silicon Valley relative to
Massachusetts' Route 128, Hyde argues that it is helpful, perhaps even
necessary, to the success of employers' investments in information
technology that her employees move on every year or two and impart the
information they have learned to other work places.
Unlike in
Massachusetts, Silicon Valley employees are free to move from employer
to employer and take with them valuable information. California does not
enforce covenants not to compete and has only modest trade secret
protection, eschewing the "inevitable disclosure" rule and limiting the
enforcement of trade secret agreements to the scope of common law
protections. 33 According to Hyde, a high-velocity labor market leads to
greater productivity, not only because it increases employer flexibility, but
also because the employees act as a valuable conduit for information by
traipsing from firm to firm over the course of their careers."
Hyde specifically distinguishes the prototype of the employment
relationship in a high velocity labor market from the traditional prototype
of the employment relationship in an internal labor market with long-term
employment. 3 As described by Hyde, the typical implicit employment
contract of a Silicon Valley information worker prescribes that the
employee accept substantial risk with respect to unemployment and
variation in compensation, in return for a promise of future "employability"
in that the worker will learn enough on the job to be more valuable to other
employers when he leaves the firm, and the employer will not interfere
with such an exit or the employee's use of his newly acquired
31.

LAURIE

J. BASSI,

ET AL., THE

ASTD

TRAINING DATA BOOK

3 (1996);

CAPPELLI,

supra note 1, at 44-45, 152-153.
32. HYDE, supra note 7, at 15-22. As Hyde reports, information workers in the
Silicon Valley think that there is "something wrong" with a resume that shows someone has
been at the same place for five years. Id. at 255.
33. Id. at 32-40.
34. Id. at xvi-xvii.
35. Id. at xiii.
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information.3 6 In contrast to the traditional implicit promise of long-term
employment, the value of the employment contract in the high velocity
labor market is premised on the assumption that the employee will not stick
around more than a few years.
How can we explain this contradiction of the traditional economic
analysis in which both employees and employer investments in general
information do very well in a high turnover labor market? Hyde argues
that the traditional economic model does not take adequate account of the
importance of employees in the disbursement of information. In addition,
it does not recognize the benefits to employers who invest in the
development of such information in having it broadly disbursed.
As previously mentioned, Hyde identifies workers as the very
embodiment of the employer's investment in information, correctly
pointing out that such investments can achieve realization only through the
work of employees.37 Indeed, Hyde gives at least one example of technical
information that has been successfully transmitted only through the transfer
of workers from one firm to another: the building of an operational TEA
laser.38 More representative of the phenomenon, however, is Hyde's
recounting of the primal myth of Silicon Valley, in which the "traitorous
eight," a group of talented but mistreated engineers, left the Shockley
Transistor Corporation in 1956, going on to found a competitor, Fairchild
Semiconductor.
Fairchild
Semiconductor
eventually
begat
the
"Fairchildren," who, in turn, left Fairchild to initiate much of the growth
and development of Silicon Valley's information industry.39
In the
information industry, workers' inter-firm connections to other workers with
knowledge of the same or related technology are more important to a
person's success in his career than any connection to a particular employer
or job. Given Hyde's description of the phenomenon, the importance of
inter-firm connections to employees seems driven by the speed with which
the technology changes in this industry, making the latest information very
valuable, but only for a brief while.'
The rapid rate of technological
development and employee connections among these firms also leads to a
"knowledge inversion" between employees and employers, in that the
employees know much more about the best means of production than the
employer."
36. Id. at 255-56.
37. Id. at 70.
38. Id. at 58 (describing the "famous tale of the TEA laser, where all its technical
aspects were published, yet no one succeeded in making one without employing someone
who had developed one someplace else"). This example, of course, raises the question of
how thefirst operational TEA laser was built.
39. Id. at 9, 29.
40. Id. at 11-12.
41. Id. at 10, 29, 56-58.
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Having identified labor with an essential role in the transmission of
information, Hyde then argues that analyses of the labor market that miss
this role are incomplete. He then comprehensively surveys existing
information economics literature to glean what industrial relations scholars
can learn from it about the employment relationship. 4 Hyde argues that
increased mobility of employees can lead to greater success for employer
investments in information technology, because the possibility of cashingin after success and changing jobs gives the employees greater incentive to
succeed."3 Positive network effects and increasing returns to scale are also
employed to explain the success of technological investments in Silicon
Valley in light of employee mobility." The existence of positive
externalities might also be used to explain the "$20 question" of why
employers along Route 128 in Massachusetts don't voluntarily agree to
employee mobility so that they can better compete with Silicon Valley.
42. Id. at 27-60.
43. Id. at 52.
44. Id. at 55. Network effects are positive or negative externalities that may arise
from uniformity in technology across a network. Michael Katz and C. Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility 75 AM. ECON. REV.424 (1985). Externalities
are benefits or costs of an activity or investment that are realized by members of the society
at large, although not entirely realized by the person undertaking the activity or investment.
HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: MODERN APPROACH 543-46 (1987).
Accordingly these benefits or costs are "external" to the person's decision whether to
undertake the activity or investment. For example, computer users experience less software
incompatibility problems by using the same operating system across an entire network of
computers. One's decision to adopt the standard operating system benefits not only that
person, but everyone else networked to his or her computer, by reducing compatibility
problems. This positive network effect is one reason why it would be such a daunting task
for any software manufacturer to displace Windows as the standard operating system.
Unfortunately this uniformity in operating systems also makes us vulnerable to worms and
viruses that only need to be designed for one system to cause great damage. This is an
example of a negative externality that is a network effect. Increasing returns to scale are
increased productivity or costs savings that are realized by increasing the scale of
production. Id. at 319-20. For example, making one microchip in a lab would be very
expensive. A person would have to develop special tools and techniques, just to create one
chip. However, if one makes a million chips, one will learn the best techniques by which to
make such chips and can invest in special machinery that will make many chips at low cost.
Indeed, the production of microchips is one of the classic examples used in economics
graduate schools to demonstrate the idea of increasing returns.
45. For an explanation of positive externalities, see id. The question presented in
this sentence is called the "$20 question" based on an old joke about economists. An
economist and a friend are walking down the street when the friend points down and says
"Look a $20 bill!" The economist does not look down and instead keeps walking saying
"There can't be a $20 bill there, if there were, someone would have already picked it up!"
In the same spirit, most economists would say there cannot be benefits to high tech firms
legal production against employer restrictions on employee mobility since the firms would
have "already picked up the $20" and voluntarily given the employees such mobility by
contract. However with positive externalities from investments in information technology
and the public nature of much information, individual employers may not have adequate
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Hyde gives a convincing account that inter-firm employee networks
and mobility have been crucial to Silicon Valley's success.46 He also
provides several theoretical economic models which bolster the idea that
the sharing of information will not necessarily result in under-investment in
such information, and indeed may be the primary determinant of economic
growth.47
Of course the point of Hyde's empirical and theoretical analysis is to
discern implications for public policy with respect to labor and
employment law. What do we learn about industrial relations policy by
taking into account the benefits of sharing information through employee
mobility?
One point that Hyde makes early in the book is that existing labor and
employment law was drafted according to the paradigm of long-term
employment and internal labor markets.4 ' Accordingly, our collective
bargaining and employee benefits laws are based on a conception of longterm employment that is becoming increasingly irrelevant in our society.49
Indeed, the definition of "employees" covered by most of our laws is based
on pre-outsourcing notion of employment that does not include many of
today's most vulnerable employees. ° Hyde, acknowledges that he is not
the first to make this point,5 nor is it necessary to go through his analysis of
information economics to conclude that the definition of an employee in
American law is outdated."

individual incentive to grant such mobility voluntarily, even though it would benefit the
industry as a whole.
46. Id. at 11-18.
47. Id. at 44-56, 71-88 (citing Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change,
98 J. OF POL. EcON. 71 (1990); Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, The Management of
Innovation, 109 Qu. J. OF EcON. 1185 (1994); James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao,
Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 84
AM. ECON. REv. 190 (1994); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information
and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REv. 561 (1971); Robert P. Merges,
The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARv. J. OF LAW & TECH. 1 (1999);
Ariel Pakes and Shmuel Nitzan, Optimum Contractsfor Research Personnel, Research
Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises, 1 J. OF LAB. ECON. 345 (1983);
Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. OF EcON. PERSPECTIVES 3
(1994)(providing a useful summary for non-economists).
48. HYDE, supra note 7, at.
49. To remedy this problem Hyde recommends national health Insurance and a
revamping of national pensions. Id. at 260. As Hyde argues, if the market cannot solve the
problems of health insurance and retirement in the high-productivity/ high-wage industry of
the Silicon Valley, how will it ever solve them for the rest of us? Id. at xix.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting
Labor and Employment Law to the Rise of the Contingent Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 879, 883-85 (1995) (noting that the definitions of "employee" within the NLRA and
OSHA exclude certain contingent workers); Jonathon P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the
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The original insight of Hyde's information economics analysis is that,
due to the value of spreading information through employees, increased
employee mobility may be good for employees, as well as employers and
the economy in general. Moreover, it may be necessary for the law to limit
employers' ability to restrict employee mobility, and later use of acquired
information, in order to promote economic growth and prosperity. Hyde
champions California's law, which leaves employee covenants not to
compete unenforceable and limits employer trade secret protection. He
argues that "economic theory and Silicon Valley reality" demonstrate that
"social advantage is normally maximized by free labor mobility" and that
"employers seeking exemption to this general rule should have to
[demonstrate] the specific disincentive to the creation of information that
free mobility would bring."53 This would seem a sound rule for public
policy even if one does not agree with all of Hyde's economic analysis.
Indeed, even under the traditional economic analysis a strong argument for
the free mobility of labor can be mounted. The simple neoclassical
economic model suggests that valuable resources, such as skilled
employees, can be most efficiently employed only if they are free to go to
their most valued use. Accordingly, restraints on mobility should be
disfavored under the law, and allowed only where a genuine societal
interest, such as efficient investment in information technology, can be
demonstrated.-'
A primary question concerning Hyde's analysis is how generally
applicable it is to workers in the economy as a whole. Silicon Valley's
labor markets for information workers seem to be very dependent on the
fast pace of technological advance and the knowledge inversion between
employers and employees.
Without this fast pace of development,
employers could perhaps learn information more efficiently through
licensing and would have greater incentive to protect property interests in
information because it would have more enduring value. Clearly Hyde
does not believe his analysis applies to all workers, and he provides
convincing examples of biotech workers, professionals and engineers who
might enjoy similar relationships to fast paced technical information 5
Contingent Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.739, 746 (1995) (arguing that the notion

of the employer-employee relationship must be redefined to reflect the emergence of the
contingent worker).
53. HYDE, supra note 7, at 67.
54. At least the general rhetoric of the common law with respect to employee
covenants not to compete is in accord with this analysis. ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW INTHE UNITED STATES 97-98 (1996).

55. HYDE, supra note 7, at 256. Another example of workers who enjoy a
knowledge inversion and who can have stronger inter-firm ties than intra-firm ties is
academics. Query as to why the academic labor market developed faculty governance and
tenure to address the problem rather than lucrative contingent pay and high mobility?
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However, it seems that he is sometimes overly optimistic as to the number
of workers whose employment relationship is organized around the
dissemination of information and, accordingly, how many employees will
benefit from the new higher velocity of the labor market. In the
introduction to his book, Hyde discusses high-velocity labor markets in
comparison to other labor market institutions such as collective bargaining
and employee ownership stating that "for the first time in my career, I feel I
am studying labor market institutions whose limits lie on the horizon, not in
our face; that create wealth and jobs, not destroy them; that reward
maturity, not dependence. 5 6 In the closing chapter of his book Hyde
speculates about high-velocity labor markets leading to broad-based social
change; however, he does expressly recognize that such markets "offer
much to workers with considerable bargaining power" and "It]he task is
now to make these job markets work for everybody."57
The resolution of the issue of how many employees are benefiting
from the acceleration of the labor market is an empirical question that fits
nicely in the proposals for future research developed by Hyde in his bookY5
One rudimentary measure of who is benefiting from increased labor
mobility in a given labor market, employers or employees, would be to
look at who is leaving whom. If discharge and layoff rates are rising in a
given market, this suggests that employers and not employees are
benefiting from the new "mobility." However, if employee quit rates are
rising in a given labor market this suggests that employees are using their
freedom of movement to gain better opportunities.
Ill. CONCLUSION

Alan Hyde's book, Working in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal
Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market, 9 is an important and original
contribution to the growing literature on the changes that have occurred in
the employment relationship in the global information economy. Hyde
presents a definitive analysis within the industrial relations and legal
literatures of an interesting and important frontier in this brave new world:
Silicon Valley. Based on his analysis, Hyde makes a convincing argument
that the role of labor mobility in the dissemination of information has been
previously overlooked. In addition, important insights can be gained by
recognizing the identity of workers with information and examining the
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Laboring in the Academic Marketplace: the Case for Tenure, 1
RTs. & EMPL. POL'Y J. 293 (1997).
56. HYDE, supra note 7, at xx.
57. Id. at 257.
58. Id. at 258-61.
59. Id.
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existing literature of information economics to glean insights about the
employment relationship. Hyde's principle policy conclusion is that the
law should promote unfettered employee mobility both for the benefit of
employees and the economic development of society as a whole. To this
end, jurisdictions should adopt laws similar to those that have nurtured
Silicon Valley in California, holding employee covenants not to compete
unenforceable and limiting employer trade secret protections. Hyde's book
is a must read for industrial relations experts and legal academics who are
interested in the evolution of the employment relationship in the new age of
global trade and information technology.

